really simple sandboxing of untrusted C programs using Linux SECCOMP
An easy way to sandbox untrusted C and C++ programs on Linux. Allows them only to allocate memory (up to a fixed amount), read and write via stdin, stdout, and stderr, and exit. Sandboxing is done using SECCOMP.
The intended use is being able to safely execute student code submissions for the CloudCoder programming exercise system, although it could be useful in other contexts.
You can run
to run the test programs. If you see "All tests passed!", then EasySandbox is working on your system.
EasySandbox is distributed under the MIT license.
If you have questions about EasySandbox, send me an email. If you have improvements that you would like to share, send me a pull request on GitHub.
makecommand to build the EasySandbox shared library.
Run the program you want to sandbox, using the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to load the EasySandbox shared library before the untrusted executable is executed:
EasySandbox defines its own implementation of
free, to ensure that the program will not need to call
mmapto allocate memory while in SECCOMP mode. The heap is a fixed size, and cannot grow while the program is running. You can control the size of the heap by setting the EASYSANDBOX_HEAPSIZE environment variable to the size of the heap in bytes. The default heap size is 8MB.
Note: EasySandbox uses _libcstart_main to hook into the startup process. If the untrusted executable defines its own entry point (rather than the normal Linux/glibc one), it could execute untrusted code. In my intended application (compiling and executing student code submissions), I control the compilation process, and I believe that as long as gcc/g++ is invoked without the
-nostdliboption, any attempt by the untrusted code to define an entry point (
_startfunction) will result in a linker error, because the name
_startwill conflict with the real
_startfunction defined in
Important: A program that calls
dlopenmight be able to bypass EasySandbox's
__libc_start_main: see this issue. Make sure that untrusted code is not linked with
When you execute a program using EasySandbox, it will print the message
followed by a newline character to both stdout and stderr. The reason is that the first call to print to an output stream causes glibc to invoke
fstat, which is not permitted when in SECCOMP mode. So, the EasySandbox shared library must print some output to stdout and stderr before entering SECCOMP mode in order for these streams to be usable. It is fairly easy to filter out this output as a post-processing step.
Similarly, reading from stdin also triggers a call to
fstat. The EasySandbox shared library works around this by putting the stdin file descriptor into nonblocking mode, attempting to read a single character using the
fgetcfunction, and then using
ungetcfunction to put the character back if one was read. This should not cause any problems for programs that use C library functions to read from stdin, but programs that use the
readsystem call to read from the stdin file descriptor may not be able to read the first byte of input.
The EasySandbox shared library implements its own
exitfunction, because glibc's invokes the
exit_groupsystem call, which is not allowed by SECCOMP. The behavior of this custom exit function attempts to emulate glibc's: it runs atexit functions, which includes destructors for static C++ objects.
EasySandbox is not intended to be used for multithreaded programs. SECCOMP will surely kill any process that attempts to create an additional thread, since creating a thread would require an invocation of the
clonesystem call, which isn't allowed by SECCOMP.
EasySandbox is designed to work with glibc, and may or may not work with other libc variants. It is entirely possible that future changes to glibc could break EasySandbox.